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Abstract 
The current study examines the impact of leverage on earning 
management in the manufacturing sector of Pakistan. It selects a list 
of 159 non-financial firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE) 
for a period of 7 years. The study has used Modified Jones Model 
1995 as proxy of earning management. Independent variable is 
leverage while the three control variables are growth, firm size and 
Return on Assets (ROA). The findings reveal that a significant 
positive relationship exists between leverage and earning 
management activities while other variables ROA and firm size are 
also found to be significant. However, no significant relationship is 
found between growth and earning management activities. 
Moreover, this study has discussed the relationship between earning 
management and discretionary accruals. The implications of the 
study for different stakeholders have been discussed also. 
Keywords: Earning management, discretionary accruals, leverage, 
non-discretionary accruals 
JEL Classification: M41 
Introduction 
Accounting system offers some gaps/opportunities to interfere in 
financial statements in order to show the anticipated profit to the 
stakeholders. Therefore, in order to meet shareholder’s expectations and 
management pressure from inside and outside the organizational entity 
respectively, managers may modify the financial statements to get the 
desired level of profit that is commonly referred to as earning 
management. Earning management was initiated recently due to large 
corporate scandals in Europe and U.S., such as Enron, Xerox and 
WorldCom. The central feature of these scandals were found due to the 
phenomenon of earning management (Goncharov, 2005). Therefore, in 
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the last few years, earning management has gained an increased attention 
of scholars and significant research has been conducted to examine the 
causes and consequences of earning management. 
 Investors and stakeholders appreciate high quality earning 
reporting as it offers users the most valuable information in taking 
effective decisions and also helps to lessen agency problems as described 
in the Agency theory by  Jensen and Meckling (1976). Leverage is one 
of the important variables that helps stakeholders to recognize the firm’s 
ability to repay liabilities, so most of the time companies are involved in 
earning management practices in order to inflate their income level 
(Ardison, Martinez, & Galdi, 2012). Many prior studies have highlighted 
that leverage is one of the variables that has an important relationship 
with earning management and can help stakeholders detect earning 
management. Managers, in order to lessen debt covenant cost, may adopt 
some specific accounting policies to report favorable financial 
statements in terms of credit worthiness (Waweru & Riro, 2013). 
However, the results vary in relation to the country’s financial policies. 
Significant research on earning management has been done in Pakistan 
from different perspectives (Ali, Noor, Khurshid, & Mahmood, 2015; 
Saleem & Alifiah, 2017). This research has produced mixed results and 
the effect of debt financing on earning management still needs to be 
investigated. This study aims to explore the impact of leverage on 
earning management in the manufacturing sector of Pakistan. The results 
of this study may help the manufacturing sector to examine the effect of 
debt on earning manipulation in order to improve the quality of earning 
management. The study is also beneficial for practitioners and 
academicians who may find new ways to extend it in the field of earning 
management. 
1.1. Research Objectives  
The motivation of this research is to find evidence for the proposition 
that leverage might influence a manager’s decisions to manage earnings. 
This research argues that the managers of firms with high debts are 
involved in manipulation of earning to portray a better picture of their 
financial position. According to Beatty and Weber (2003), when a 
company relies on debt the managers are inclined towards income 
increasing accounting accruals to abide by the debt covenant cost 
imposed by banks and other financial institutions. 
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Earning management has been defined in many ways. According to 
Schipper (1989), it is an intentional interference in financial statements 
in order to gain some personal or organizational benefits. Bloom, Sadun, 
and Reenen (2015) defined earning management as a process of 
manipulation in financial reporting to gain some potential benefits for 
the organization. In simple words, earning management is the 
manipulation of financial statements to show the desired level of 
earnings in order to meet shareholders’ expectations or to attain some 
organizational benefits. However, it is not always linked with the 
manipulation of accounting data but is more associated with selecting an 
accounting procedure from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) (Veronica, 2015). 
2.1. Earning Management Proxies 
Earning management has a long history which highlights the 
circumstances in which it has been practiced and also its consequences. 
Some earlier studies focused on selecting accounting methods and 
choice of accounting tools as proxies of earning management 
(Badertscher, 2011; Dechow, & Schrand, 2010; Zang, 2011). 
There are two techniques of earning management, that is, 
Accrual-based Earning Management (AEM) and Real Earning 
Management (REM). AEM constitutes the manipulation in financial 
reporting procedures within Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), whereas REM comprises the deviation in real transactions 
during normal business practices (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Most of the studies in literature have used accruals to calculate 
earning management. However, there are some studies which are based 
on REM. Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) identified that 
managers are more involved in REM rather than AEM because real 
earning management is not easy to detect as it involves manipulation in 
real transactions. But according to Zang (2011), AEM is the most 
important tool in earning management. Previous studies have used 
different methods to determine AEM. However, the most powerful tool 
to measure earning management has been  the use of discretionary 
accruals, that is, modified ones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 
1995). In 1991, Jones introduced a model to measure earning 
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management through discretionary accruals that was further modified by 
Dechow et al. (1995) to remove the conjecture propensity of Jones’ 1991 
Model and to calculate the discretionary accruals accounting for the error 
when managers use their judgment over revenues.  
2.2. Empirical Evidence Supporting Leverage and Earning 
Management Relation 
Significant research exists about the relationship between financial 
leverage and earning management using AEM and REM techniques. 
There are two different aspects of elucidating the connection between 
leverage and earning management. Some previous studies suggest that 
leverage increases the possibility of earning management to evade debt 
covenant cost. Sweeney (1994) provides direct proof to support the 
hypothesis that high debt levels induce managers to choose income 
increasing accounting measures. Literature also reveals that managers 
manipulate income in order to portray a strong financial position and 
firms with high debt level are more involved in earning management 
activities in order to avoid reporting loss (Ardison et al., 2012; Waweru 
& Riro, 2013).  
Positive association between leverage and earning management 
can also be evidenced with the financial distress theory explained by 
Fung and Goodwin (2013). This study inspected the impact of debt on 
earning management in financially distressed firms; results found a 
positive link between earning management activities and short term debt 
in case of firms which were financially distressed. Ujah and Brusa (2011) 
also investigated the impact of cash flow volatility and financial leverage 
and on AEM activities. This study identified that both cash flow 
volatility and leverage affect the degree to which firms control their 
earnings. Moreover, customer staples and consumer cyclical groups are 
more involved in earning management activities.  
2.3. Empirical Evidences Opposing Leverage and Earning 
Management Relation 
Although literature reveals the positive link between financial leverage 
and earning management, still there is also evidence to the contrary 
provided by some studies. Iturriaga and Hoffmann (2005) identified the 
negative link between leverage and AEM on the basis that managers of 
high leveraged firms are less involved in earning manipulation because 
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creditors are more interested in debt services than any other accounting 
information.  
Although extended literature has been found about earning 
management in Pakistan, (Haider, Ali, & Sadiq, 2012; Naz, Bhatti, 
Ghafoor, & Husein, 2011; Tabassum, Kaleem, & Nazir, 2014; Tahir, 
Sabir, & Shah, 2011) but the effect of leverage on earning management 
is still pending for investigation. This study contributes to the ongoing 
debate about the link between leverage and AEM in the manufacturing 
sector of Pakistan.  
3. Hypothesis Development 
Based on the arguments presented in the literature review, the following 
hypotheses were developed. 
Ho: Financial leverage has no significant effect on AEM. 
Hi: Financial leverage has a significant effect on AEM. 
4. Research Methodology 
This study selected 159 non-financial firms listed on Pakistan Stock 
Exchange (PSX) from major four sectors, including textiles, cement, 
chemical and pharma for the period spanning from 2009 to 2015. All 
financial firms were excluded due to their different capital structure and 
accounting practices. Data was gathered from annual reports published 
on the official websites and from “financial statement analysis of non-
financial firms listed on PSX” published by the State Bank of Pakistan. 
Data was collected based on its availability for the variables of the study. 
Modified Jones Model ( Dechow et al., 1995) was used as a measure of 
AEM and panel data analysis technique was used with the help of Stata 
software.  
This study employs earning management as a dependent 
variable and leverage as an independent variable along with three control 
variables, including Return on Assets (ROA), firm growth (growth) and 
firm size. Based on literature review, the theoretical framework of this 
study is as follows, 
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Independent /control variables   Dependent Variable 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
4.1. Measuring Dependent Variable 
4.1.1. Earning Management. Based on the literature, this study 
measures earning management using AEM technique. Modified Jones 
Model (Dechow et al., 1995) was used to measure discretionary accruals. 
The Modified Jones Model for calculating the non-discretionary 
part of accruals is as follows, 
NDACC / Ait-1= β1j [1/Ait-1] + β2j (Δ REV/ Ait-1 - Δ REC it) / TA it 
-1 + β3j (PPE it / Ait-1)   (1) 
where 
NDACC= Non-discretionary accruals 
At-1= Total assets for the period t-1 
ΔREV = Percentage change in sales revenue from last year sales revenue 
ΔREC= Change in the values of account receivables from the previous 
year 
TA= Total amount of assets over period of one year 
PPE= Property plant and equipment (gross, operating fixed assets at 
cost) 
In order to use the specific parameters of firm in the above 
equation, the following equation was used in regression.  
Leverage 
Firm size 
Growth  
ROA 
Earning 
Management 
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TACCt/Ait-1 = β1j [1/Ait-1] + β2j [(ΔREVit – ΔARit)]/ Ait-1 + β3j 
[PPEit/ Ait-1] + εit   (2) 
where in ΔARit is change in accounts receivables, and total 
accruals (TACC) can be calculated through balance sheet approach, that 
is,  
TACC= (∆CA −∆CASH −∆CL + ∆STDEBT − DEPN) 
where; 
TACC  total accruals  
∆CA  change in current assets  
∆CL  change in current liabilities  
∆CASH  change in cash in hand  
∆STDEBT  change in short term debt  
DEPN   depreciation  
To measure the non-discretional accrual amount, specific 
amounts of firm for each independent variable are employed for each 
period industry wise, since each variable (TAC/Ait-1, ΔREVit – ΔARit, 
PPEit/ Ait-1) is coming from the same firm, with each dataset from a 
different time period. Once β1j, β2j, β3j have been measured for the 
cross-section of the firms for the period spanning from 2009 to 2015 
through the regression equation (Eq 2) given above, these coefficients 
are added in eq (1) to calculate the non-discretionary accrual part of 
firms. 
Discretionary Accruals (DACC) are then calculated by 
measuring the difference of Total Accruals (TACC) and Non-
Discretionary Accruals (NDACC), which is the proxy of AEM.  
DACC = TACC-NDACC 
All variables in the regression model are standardized by total 
assets (t-1) to remove the problem of the size effect of firm.  
4.2. Measurement of Independent Variables  
The chief independent variable in this study is leverage. Leverage is 
defined as the use of long term finance scaled by firm’s assets. 
Companies with more long-term debts are considered to be highly 
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leveraged. Leverage is measured through debt ratio, that is, total 
debts/total assets. 
Other control variables are also measured as follows, 
Return on Assets Net income/Average total assets  
Firm Size  Natural log of total assets  
Sale Growth  Percentage change in sales  
Finally, to test the correlation of leverage with control variables 
for earning management the following regression model is developed,  
DACCit = 0 + β1 Levit+ β2 Sales growth it + β3Size it + β4ROAit + it 
5. Results 
Data analysis starts with descriptive statistics followed by correlation 
and then finally regression results are shown and discussed in order to 
test the validity of the hypothesis. Stata software is used for regression 
analysis.  
5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive analysis shows the minimum, mean, maximum, and 
standard deviation values of the variables. Results from descriptive 
statistics (Table 1) provide mean discretionary accruals (DACC) of 
about 0.0094535 with standard deviation of 0.3126321. The value of 
standard deviation is large for growth, that is, 1.54675. Whereas, Return 
on Asset (ROA) has the lowest value of 0.156 as compared to other 
variables. The results imply that on average selected firms are engaged 
in downward earning management activities. The maximum value of 
DACC (2.7475) indicates positive abnormal accruals among sample 
firms that may suggest that accruals are being managed upward to avoid 
earning loss. However, the minimum negative value (-2.4063) suggests 
that accruals are managed downwards to avoid earning increases. Low 
values of earning management indicate a high level of earning quality in 
selected firms. The results are consistent with Uwuigbe, Uwuigbe, and 
Bernard (2015) and Waseemullah, Safi and Shehzadi (2015). Mean 
values of ROA and growth are 0.0296482 and 0.1830255, respectively 
with standard deviations of 0.1563653 and 1.54675, respectively. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DACC 1133 0.0095 0.3126 -2.4063 2.7475 
Leverage 1133 0.4217 0.3095 0.000 3.5667 
ROA 1133 0.0296 0.1564 -1.6431 3.1953 
Growth 1133 0.1831 1.5468 -4.5356 36.1123 
Firm Size 1133 8.5101 0.7119 6.6127 11.5626 
Note: DACC represents the discretionary accruals. Leverage represents the debt ratio, that is, total debt/total 
assets. ROA represents the return on total assets. Growth represents the percentage change in growth. Firm size 
represents the natural log of total assets. 
The relationship between dependent and independent variables 
can be observed from the following graphs. These line graphs show the 
trend of variables over a period of seven years. Significant correlation in 
the trend of discretionary accruals (DACC) with debt ratio, firm size and 
ROA can be observed, whereas the growth variable shows a different 
trend. 
 
Figure 2.  Relationship between DACC and Debt Ratio 
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Figure 3. Relationship between DACC and ROA 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between DACC and Firm Size 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between DACC and growth 
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5.2. Correlation Analysis 
Correlation analysis is the most common type of analysis and is a useful 
tool to test the strength of connection between dependent and 
independent variables. It also helps to check the multi-collinearity 
problem in the dataset. Pearson Correlation is the most common 
correlation measure in statistics. It explains the linear relationship and 
degree of correlation between independent variables (Pearson, 1895). Its 
value ranges between +1 and -1, where +1 indicates a high positive 
correlation and -1 indicates a totally negative linear correlation. 
Pearson’s correlation is less than 0.80 between independent variables, 
which proves the absence of multi-collinearity between them  
(Bassiouny, Soliman, & Ragab, 2016; Soliman, 2013). Table 2 gives the 
correlation matrix results between independent variables. According to 
the results, all independent variables are free of multi-collinearity 
problem as the value of all coefficients is less than 0.80. The highest 
correlation can be seen between ROA and DACC. 
Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
 DACC Leverage ROA Growth Firm size 
DACC 1     
Leverage 0.0600 1    
ROA 0.2936 -0.1551 1   
Growth 0.0676 -0.0277 0.0628 1  
Firm Size 0.1373 -0.2293 0.0922 0.0385 1 
Note: DACC represents the discretionary accruals. Leverage represents the debt ratio, that is, total debt/total 
assets. ROA represents the return on total assets. Growth represents the percentage change in growth. Firm size 
represents the natural log of total assets.  
5.3. Final Regression  
Hausman test was carried out for the sampled data which suggests the 
use of random-effect model instead of fixed-effect model. Diagnostic 
test has been applied also which shows that dataset has hetroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation problem but is free from multi-collinearity. To 
ensure the reliability and validity of statistical results, this study has used 
panel data regression to adjust the standard errors of coefficients against 
possible dependence in the residuals. Robust standard errors are widely 
accepted and commonly relied on in case of any violation to get the valid 
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statistical regression results (Hoechle, 2007). Table 3 gives the results of 
random-effect model with cluster ID.  
Table 3 
GLS Random Effect Regression Results with Robust Standard Errors 
DACC Coef. Std. Error z P>z 
Leverage 0.1457 0.0385 3.79 0.000 
ROA 0.6157 0.0717 8.59 0.000 
Growth 0.0103 0.0102 1.02 0.309 
Firm size 0.0623 0.0197 3.16 0.002 
_cons -0.6022 0.1646 -3.66 0.000 
No. of observations 1113 
No. Of groups 159 
R-squared 37.47% 
Wald chi2(4) 102.30 
Prob > chi2 0.000 
Note: DACC represents the discretionary accruals. Leverage represents the debt ratio, that is, total debt/total 
assets. ROA    represents the return on total assets. Growth represents the percentage change in growth. Firm size 
represents the natural log of total assets. 
 The regression model is shown to be highly significant because 
the significance level is 0.000. R-square of the study is 37.47% which is 
good enough and it is also consistent with previous studies such as  
Aman, Pourjalali, and Teruya (2006) Zamri, Rahman, and Isa (2013), 
Abbadi, Hijazi, and Al-Rahahleh (2016) and Briamonte, Addeo, Fiano, 
and Sorrentino (2017). 
 Results obtained after testing the first hypothesis show that 
financial leverage has a significant positive impact on AEM activities 
which means that when financial leverage increases, then managers are 
more involved in AEM. When the firms have a high debt level, they face 
the pressure of debt covenant cost and the managers adopt accounting 
policies to manipulate earnings in order to report a favorable financial 
statement. So, they are also involved in increasing AEM to report 
favorable earnings in order to attract the investors. The results are also 
consistent with previous studies such as (Bassiouny et al., 2016; Ujah & 
Brusa, 2014; Uwuigbe et al., 2015; Vakilifard & Mortazavi, 2016). With 
reference to control variables, ROA and firm size are found to be 
significant and positively related to AEM, similarly to the previous 
studies of (Moradi, Salehi, & Najari, 2012; Zadeh, Salehi, & Alaei, 
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2012). As the size of firm increases, incentive for the manager to indulge 
in AEM also increases.  
One reason for this positive relationship could be that large firms 
have to show positive and increased earnings because they face more 
pressure from financial analysts and stakeholders. So, they are involved 
in income increasing accrual management. Another reason could be that 
large firms have strong management powers which give them the 
bargaining power to deal with auditors and investors and it also makes it 
easy for them to manipulate earnings. ROA is a sign of profitability 
which shows how profitable the firm is with reference to its assets. High 
profitability increases the opportunistic behavior of the managers which 
motivates them to manipulate earnings for certain purposes. However, 
growth is not found to be significant enough to have any relationship 
with AEM, which is similar to the findings of Collins, Pungaliya, and 
Vijh (2017). This may be due to the reason that high growth firms have 
a strong financial position and they are in a better position to deal with 
auditors. Since these firms also attracte investors due to their high growth 
potential, so they don’t need to manipulate earnings. 
Another approach to deal with hetroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in panel data is Park’s Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) estimators. Though, it can be employed only when the number 
of cross-sections (N) is less than or equal to the time periods (T). Hence, 
Beck and Katz (1995) extended the customized version of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) which is also known as “Panel Correlated Standard 
Errors” (PCSE). PCSE estimators performs better significantly as 
compared to FGLS estimators in many conditions (Reed & Ye, 2011). 
In STATA pooled OLS regression, panel correlated standard errors are 
calculated with xtpcse command. This command computes the panel 
correlated standard error for the data of cross-sectional time series 
models, where the parameters are estimated by OLS or Prais–Winston 
regression. In calculating the robust standard errors estimates, xtpcse 
command pre-supposes that disturbances are by default hetroskedastic 
and correlated across panels (Hoechle, 2007). So, PCSE estimators have 
been widely adopted. The application of these estimators can be 
observed in many previous studies (Bitzer & Stephan, 2007; Lago-
Peñas, 2006; Marques, 2005; Mosca, 2007). The results of PCSE have 
been reported in Annexure I as Table 4. 
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6. Conclusions 
This study investigated the influence of leverage on AEM in 159 non-
financial firms listed at Pakistan Stock Exchange for the period of 7 
years. Earning management was taken as the dependent variable and 
leverage as independent variable along with three control variables, 
including growth, firm size, and ROA. Based on regression results, it is 
concluded that debt ratios, that is, leverage has a positive association with 
AEM which means that high debt level motivates the managers to be 
involve in earning management either to report the desired profit level or 
to gain certain organizational goals. The research indicates that the need 
to control their debt level in order to avoid manipulations in their 
earnings.  
This study contributes in the literature which examines the 
impact of debt level on earning management. Moreover, the main 
findings of this study suggest that there are negative consequences of 
debt on the performance of firms. Due to the increased debt level, 
managers are more worried about their financial position towards 
investors, therefore they tend to engage in accrual manipulation. The 
findings of this research will be helpful for future researchers who wish 
to conduct further research in the area of earning management. 
7. Limitations and Recommendations 
This study has some limitations which can be overcome by future 
researchers. Firstly, this study has used only one model, that is, Modified 
Jones Model 1995, as a proxy for earning management. Other models in 
literature can also be used to find the tradeoff between the two. Secondly, 
this study has used the overall analysis of non-financial firms from 
different sectors; sector-wise analysis can also be a major contribution in 
the area of earning management. Furthermore, other control variables 
may be added to extend the scope of the study to get better results. 
Based on the results of this study, it is recommended that firms 
control their debt level in order to reduce the manipulation in accrual 
management. Higher debt level increases the monitoring of financial 
analysts and other stakeholders could also be subject to scrutinized 
earning management activities. The results of this study also have an 
inference for investors, auditors, investors and regulators. High debt 
level of a firm can be a signal to investors to check for manipulated 
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earnings. So, it is recommended to examine the financial statement 
carefully before making any investment decision. Auditors and 
regulators can also increase regulations to control AEM. 
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Annexure 1 
Table 4 
Winston regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
DACC Coef. 
Panel 
Correlated 
Standards 
Error 
z-Static P>z 
Leverage 0.1465 0.0567 2.58 0.010 
ROA 0.6054 0.0654 9.26 0.000 
Growth 0.0097 0.0055 1.78 0.075 
Firm Size 0.0604 0.0184 3.28 0.001 
_cons -0.5853 0.1593 -3.67 0.000 
rho     .0763303     
No. of observations 1113.00 
No. of groups 0159.00 
R-Squared 0037.47 
Wald chi2(4)   0102.21 
 Prob > chi2   0000.00 
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